As a New York Times reviewer noted at the time, some Israelis were incensed that the author of Arabesques was an Israeli Arab. "What is an Arab doing writing in our language, the language of our religion and of our experience (and, yes, of the nation)? If Hebrew means Jewish - and for thousands of years it has - what now? What does this mean for our literature? Our culture? Our state?" Others had a contrasting but equally emotional response. Amos Oz, the accomplished Israeli writer and intellectual, said at the time when asked whether he thinks the fact that a successful novel has been written by an Israeli Arab is a turning point in Israeli society: "I think of this as a triumph, not necessarily for Israeli society, but for the Hebrew language. If the Hebrew language is becoming attractive enough for a non-Jewish Israeli to write in it, then we have arrived."

Some saw the novel as a protest of sorts, and Shammas's ruminations regarding his novel seem to fit that characterisation. "What I had in mind with Arabesques, what I call it, is my identity card,'' Shammas said in 1988. ''In Israel, on your actual identity card, there is a space for nationality, and in this space you are 'Arab' or 'Jew.' Now with my novel I was trying to prove -to myself, in writing it, as much as to anyone who might read it - that there is something which I think of as Israeli, which is not a matter of Arab or Jew, but a matter of living in a place called Israel.''

Compared to the late 1980's, the impact of the Hebrew language upon the Israeli Arabs has only become stronger and more widespread. This is not surprising: as new generations grow up in the midst of an Israeli culture where Hebrew is the dominant language it is to be expected that they would  (whether consciously or unconsciously, whether by will or by force) adopt Hebrew to varying extents. Hebrew and Arabic are both the official languages in Israel, though there have been recent attempts by Knesset members from the Likud and Kadima parties to make Hebrew the sole primary language of Israel, with Arabic, Russian, and English becoming secondary languages. Israeli Arabs cannot function without at least a rudimentary knowledge of Hebrew. Israel's universities teach in Hebrew (or English), for example, and so Israeli Arab students must of course gain a high level of competency in Hebrew; and official documents (such as for tax or accounting purposes) are in Hebrew and thus many shopkeepers in Israeli Arab towns and cities tend to keep their records in Hebrew. "The receipt books are in Hebrew," said a shopkeeper recently, "so that we can show them to the tax authorities or the accountants, and as a result, we are forgetting our Arabic." The Hebrew words that have entered the Israeli Arab lexicon roughly fall into two sorts: everyday expressions (that might appear in spoken language or on street signs, etc.), and words that Arabs associate with Israeli culture. Everyday expressions include such words as b’seder (all right, okay), b’vakasha (please) and me’anyen (interesting), whereas the latter category includes such words as ramzor (traffic light), machsom (checkpoint), g’lidah (ice cream), lachmaniyah (bakery roll) and sulamit (the hash sign on telephone dials).

Such a linguistic phenomenon is far from unique and occurs in many situations where two or more languages intersect. The difference here, however, is the political overtones of such a growing phenomenon. An Israeli social linguist remarks that "Israel's Arabs are developing their own independent identity, different from that of the Palestinians in the territories and other Arabs." Such a conclusion appears unavoidable, especially in light of the several generations in which the Palestinians outside Israel have been seaprated from the Palestinians inside Israel (the Israeli Arabs). This conclusion has enraged many Arabs outside Israel who point to the continuity and solidarity that the Palestinians outside of Israel have in regard to the Palestinians inside of Israel. Such a continuity is seen as essential in the struggle to free the region of the injustices that burden and afflict the Palestinian people. But the divide is evident (though perhaps is will reach an asymptote acceptable to both sides). The social linguist Muhammad Amara notes that Hebrew as used by the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories "is totally different, and is related to military terms. The most-used word is, of course, machsom [roadblock], as the roadblocks have taken over life there.” The use of Hebrew by the Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, can be seen in terms of an emerging and somewhat separate identity. Amara continues in regard to the Israeli Arabs: “Undoubtedly, it indicates that, although this society is Arabic and Palestinian, there’s something that distinguishes it from other Palestinian groups — whether in the territories or in the [Palestinian] diaspora — and it’s the fact that they’re in contact with the Jewish society and are influenced by it.”

The increasing use of Hebrew by Israeli Arabs is frowned upon by Arabs outside of Israel because they see it as an erosion of the Arabic culture and language. Amara notes that this process ("that is shaking the Arabs to their very foundations") is a functional one: "Arabs cannot afford not to develop a broad association with Jewish society unless they want to cut themselves off completely, and I don't think they want that. They need Hebrew from the moment the step out of their homes, but this is not an Israelization of their Palestinian-Arab identity. They share none of the sentiments in Israel's Jewish symbols, and feel no connection to them." Indeed, as Amara rightly points out, a peaceful resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict will mean that such a process will most probably be reciprocated, with Israelis adopting Arabic and both languages would thus perhaps work in symbiosis and help to create a new identity that, as Anton Shammas said, is a matter of being Israeli and "not a matter of Arab or Jew, but a matter of living in a place called Israel.''

As a closing note, let us observe that such a symbiosis is indeed occurring: as Amara notes and as I know from personal experience, "Even today every Jew knows hundreds of words in Arabic, without even realizing it."

The accusation to which it is almost impossible to reply or redress, in my opinion, is that of "lack of balance". The spokesperson for the Israeli embassy in England insisted that the Barbican Arts Centre "balance its activities". Now, this may seem like a silly and naive question, but what does it mean for an organisation to "balance its activities"? The Barbican is holding London's Palestinian Film Festival this year, which is the biggest event of its kind in Europe. There have been Israeli film festivals in London in the past, just not at the Barbican (though there is a Yiddish film festival planned for next year), nevertheless, a member of the Zionist Federation is irritated that "If the Barbican thinks a Yiddish film season in 2009 goes any way towards balancing four successive years of Palestinian film festivals, they are wrong. It is about as much balance as would be putting chicken soup and salt beef on their restaurant menu." This strange, incessant and somewhat ridiculous call for universal "balance" is very common. For example, CAMERA (Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America) is "a media-monitoring, research and membership organization devoted to promoting accurate and balanced coverage of Israel and the Middle East"; Honest Reporting, which states that "Israel is in the midst of a battle for public opinion – waged primarily via the media", sees its task to be "To ensure Israel is represented fairly and accurately", it "monitors the media, exposes cases of bias, promotes balance, and effects change through education and action"; AIJAC (Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council) complains about the SBS Codes of Practice by saying that "there is no requirement for balance or accuracy in documentaries, there is no requirement that reports include sufficient relevant facts to give a proper understanding of the issues, only errors of fact regarded by SBS as 'significant' need be corrected...". (Apart from these, and other, pro-Israeli media watchdog groups, there are a number of pro-Palestinian media watchdog groups such as Arab Media Watch or Palestine Media Watch; click here for an extensive list of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian groups.)

I am well aware that the call for balance is out of suspicion (at times justified, at times not) that Israel is being "demonised", that a "double standard" is applied to Israel, that the circumstances in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are somehow unique and thus must be treated on their own terms, etc. But these suspicions are subject to the facts. If an organisation states that Israel is being demonised by a certain television station or journalist or politician or whoever, first you have to show that that is the case. Assuming that you have proved your case (and there have been cases where this has occurred), don't stop there, you have to ask why that television station (etc.) appears to be demonising Israel. Could it be something Israel did? When a crime is committed (whether it be a journalist or politician falsifying evidence, or an army commander targeting civilians), one of the first things that the relevant authorities (the police, the International Criminal Court , etc.) look for is a motive. Why did they commit the crime? And the same tactic should be used in regard to the accusations of "demonisation" etc. that are shown to be justified. Why would someone want to demonise Israel? Could it be something that Israeli did?

Calling for balance is superfluous and ridiculous if all it means is that the side of the one who calls for balance should also be heard. One must take an opinion contrary to one's own seriously, debate its merits and question its motives and evidence. Doing otherwise is unhelpful and arrogant to say the least. As John Stuart Mill said in the mid 19th century in his book On Liberty: "If the [opposing] opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error."

The city of Hebron, where approximately 800 Jewish settlers reside amongst 166,000 Palestinians, has and continues to be the epicentre of some of the most vile, indiscriminate and abhorrent behaviour displayed by the Jewish settlers towards not only their Palestinian neighbours, but also towards Israeli police, the Israeli army, and many visitors and activists. Hebron is where the Tomb of the Patriarchs is located, a sacred site to both Jews and Muslims who believe that the Biblical Fathers were buried there. It is the second largest Palestinian city in the West Bank "and the only one that harbours a Jewish settlement in its midst". The problem is not the Jewish presence per se, it is the behaviour of the settlers and the consequences of such behaviour on the policies of the Israeli government and the Israeli military in regard to Hebron. For example, in the late 1990's the city was separated into a Jewish and a Palestinian part (see the map below; taken from the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs). This resulted in a "legal and physical segregation between the Israeli settlers and the Palestinian majority" that led to "the economic collapse of the center of Hebron and drove many Palestinians out of the area." (Although area H2 is controlled by Israel and area H1 is controlled by the Palestinians, the population numbers in both areas are predominantly Palestinian.) There exists "severe and extensive restrictions on Palestinian movement" in Hebron, and the soldiers, as the Breaking the Silence report makes clear, are either complicit or oblivious to the settlers' violent attacks (both physical and verbal) on the Palestinians (see for example, B'Tselem's Shooting Back project, where Palestinians living in high-conflict areas were given video cameras to record illegal activity by the Israeli army and Jewish settlers).

The Hebron violence and animosity is of course not wholly the domain of the Jewish settlers, but the Palestinian residents of Hebron do not have thousands of soldiers protecting them (perhaps the "ratio is 1 settler to 4 soldiers") and the Israeli government, at the very least, is heavily biased towards the Israeli settlers. Thus the actions of the Hebron Jewish settlers is more pertinent, and cowardly. It is cowardly because, as quickly becomes evident whilst reading the Break the Silence report, the adult settlers very rarely engage in actual "flagrant, physical violence": rather, "they send their kids to do it." They send their kids to "throw stones at the girls from Cordoba (a Palestinian girls’ school)", they send their kids to "pick up building blocks that look about 5 kilos each, and simply throw them at the cars [of the TIPH (Temporary International Presence at Hebron) activists], smashing glass", they send their kids to do these and other acts of vandalism and intimidation because the adults know that, as one soldier in the report put it: "Listen, you know that these are kids under the age of 14 so there’s nothing I can do.” Another soldier noted to himself that one day that "your mission is to protect Palestinian homes from little, vicious Jewish children. Period. That’s the mission there on Saturdays."

The report also highlights the soldiers' own behaviour, regardless of what the settlers do. Incidents of beatings ("Then the rest of the guys on patrol saw the beating. Everyone jumped on him… They beat him up, really beat him up… Hit him with sticks, in the head… And then one started choking him, with two hands. He [the Palestinian] was 17 or 18"), theft ("A little looting was normal. Backgammon and cigarettes, everything… Everything that looked nice we took. Other guys took presents for their girlfriends from stores") and vandalism ("Some of us kept clubs in our vests. It would get to the point where we’d be walking down the street, patrolling, suddenly stop a vehicle, just for the sake of it, stop it, check it out, break doors and such, not really gentle. Smash up the door from inside. Maybe they’re hiding weapons") are just a few deplorable examples.

It is difficult to put all the blame on the soldiers themselves, most of whom are straight out of high school with little notion of the bigger picture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (when asked "what are the procedures you’re given, generally, regarding the settlers?", a solider in the report answered: "Nothing"); the bulk of the blame should lie with the authorities, with the Israeli government and the Israeli Defence Forces, for creating an environment that in a sense turns these young soldiers (many of whom believe that they are in the army to protect the State of Israel) into instruments of coercion. Such an environment is reminiscent of the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment, in which American college students took part in a simulation of prison life. Part of the students were given the role of prison guards and rest of their fellow students were given the role of prison inmates. The experiment had to be ended prematurely after only six days because the the prison guards became horribly sadistic, doing things to their friends that they would never have imagined they could do to their own classmates.

The Stanford Prison Experiment sought to discover "What happens when you put good people in an evil place? Does humanity win over evil, or does evil triumph?" And there are certain parallels with the case of the soldiers in the Breaking the Silence report: the soldiers are put in a position of overwhelming power and dominance ("I can safely say that the power you wield there is incredible"), and if the students in the Stanford experiment were able to do such horrible things to their friends and peers, it does not take a vivid imagination to realise that the young Israeli soldiers in Hebron are likely to do horrible things to the Palestinian residents (whom most soldiers do not see as their peers nor as their friends). This by no means absolves the soldiers of responsibility for their disgusting acts, but in the broader context we can come to better understand the causes of the soldiers' behaviour and work towards rehabilitating and changing the overall political and military structure that puts them in those situations in the first place.

The enmity between the US and Iran is nothing new, it goes back to at least 1953, when, after nationalizing the oil industry, then Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence. Therefore comments such as the above should perhaps not be surprising given the history of the two countries, but what is alarming is that Western leaders have been impulsively comparing current Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a "modern Hitler". The most recent example that comes to mind is former Israeli Prime Minister (and current opposition leader) Benyamin Netanyahu, who recently stated, along with two other members of the Knesset, that the task of the United States "as the leader of the free world, is to act to remove the Iranian threat on world peace. Ahmadinejad is a modern Hitler and we cannot now repeat the mistakes that were made before the Second World War."

Let us put things in perspective: Ahmadinejad is not the modern Hitler; as president of Iran, he doesn't even have sole control of the army, and it is the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, who has the ultimate say in all major policy decisions of Iran, including declaring war. There is no doubt that Ahmadinejad has made some unwarranted, racist, and unhelpful statements (some provoked, some not), but that's true of all sides (the US, Israel, the EU, etc.). By comparing Ahmadinejad to Hitler, these Western leaders risk diluting the impact of a comparison between a modern day government or dictator and that of the Nazi Party and Hitler. We must of course be forever vigilant in order to prevent the rise of fascist dictators and the repetitions of past horrors such as the Nazi Holocaust, but we cannot allow the use of labels such as "the modern Hitler" to be used indiscriminately, for then they would lose all meaning and thus be reduced to clichés (like the label "the modern Einstein", that has been used so much that the label has lost its prestige).

And what of the threat to "the free world" that Iran poses? US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said it best late last year. She stated that the US was well within its rights to impose sanctions against Iran and that "We're taking additional actions to defend our interests and our citizens, and to help our friends to secure their countries". In other words, Rice states that the US is well within its rights to defend its (financial) interests by whatever means, and since "our friends" help the US to achieve their aims, the US will make sure their countries are secure (so that they can continue to help the US achieve their aims). If a country's interests happens to conflict with the interests of the US then that country is no longer "our friend", and the US is thus "well within its rights" to defend its interests by whatever means it sees fit.

I am not trying to deny that the stand-off between Israel and Iran, amongst others, is a dangerous predicament that could result in an all out war with many casualties; but the reasons for the conflict are much more complicated than "Ahmadinejad is a modern Hitler and therefore his aim is to wipe Israel off the map."

The one-state solution was first proposed by left wing Zionists in the early 20th century (most notably Judah Magnes and Martin Buber, who were the authors, amongst a handful of others, of Palestine - Divided or United? The Case for a Bi-National Palestine before the United Nations, click here for details of their UN appearance), at a time when Jews were a small minority in Palestine. The Palestinians at the time did not agree to such a proposal. Then, in the mid-20th century, some Palestinians called for a move towards a "democratic, nonsectarian state, in which Jews, Muslims, and Christians will live together as equals". For the Israelis, as Avnery notes, "this was just a polite way of saying that their state must be dismantled." Thus, "No takers again." But in the last decade or so, the one-state solution has been resurrected and its supporters include many who once believed in the two-state solution but now believe that, assuming the "facts on the ground" remain as they are, it is impossible. There are several proposals in regards to the implementation of the one-state solution (some are much more concrete than others), these are outlined, amongst many others, in the books and articles cited above (see also Khada Karmi's Married to Another Man: Israel's Dilemma in Palestine), but the overarching theme is, as Karmi notes, one of a secular state in which all citizens will have equal rights and whose membership will not be derived from ethnic or religious groups; citizens will be equal before the law as individuals, irrespective of race or religion. Supporters of the one-state solution admit that its implementation is difficult and near-impossible, but they argue that it is the only thing that can be done that will bring justice, peace, and security to both Israelis and Palestinians.

The question of the nature of a binational state should be considered together with the following:

(1) Is there a chance that the two sides will accept a binational state?
(2) If so, will the binational state be able to function?
(3) If so, will this put an end to the conflict?

Avnery's "answer to all three questions is an unequivocal No." Let us take a brief look at his reasoning.

(1) Avnery does not believe that Israel would accept a binational state in the foreseeable future ("and no other future is relevant"). This is because it "contradicts the basic Zionist ethos of the State of Israel." Zionism was founded in part as a response to European nationalism that was steeped in anti-Semitism, peaking in the Second World War. Israel thus  allowed the Jews some sort of a safe haven. A binational state would be seen as the elimination of the only safe haven for the Jews of the world: this is a psychological barrier that would be take generations to overcome. "Can the Palestinian people wait for 50 or 100 years for such a miracle to happen? With the relentless push of the Israeli settlements going on, what will remain of Arab Palestine then?" On the other side, Avnery doubts that the Palestinians would accept a binational state.

(2) Even if both people can agree to a binational state, will it be able to function? Avnery states that there is not "a single instance of two nations living peacefully in one common binational or multinational state." Canada, where "two highly civilised communities, divided by nothing but language, totter perpetually on the brink of brakeup", is apparently not such an instance; neither is Belgium, where "Walloons and Flemings have been living together for centuries, but whose interaction has at best been uneasy"; neither is Cyprus. The only success according to Avnery is Switzerland, but that is an anomaly because it is "the result of a centuries-old process, the very opposite of an artificial creation imposed by an act of will". It is perhaps a bit extravagant of Avnery to suggest that there is not a single instance of two nations living peacefully in a binational state, and the tensions that exist in Canada or Belgium would be a dream come true compared to the tensions that exist between the Israelis and Palestinians. Nevertheless, Avnery holds that it is utopian to believe that the Israelis and Palestinians, "two extremely nationalistic peoples, could turn practically overnight from total enemies into loving compatriots".

(3) The third question, whether a binational state would bring an end to the conflict, is perhaps a moot point since one cannot know in advance how such an arrangement would transpire. Avnery believes that a binational state would leave the Israeli superiority intact and turn the Palestinians into "an exploited underclass devoid of real power." It is far more probable, says Avnery, that a binational state would develop "in the direction of the former South Africa, with years and years of violent struggle ahead."

The above was just a rough sketch of the debate over the one-state versus the two-state solution, there is of course much more to consider and discuss, but for many (Avnery notwithstanding) the difficulties and seemingly insurmountable hurdles in front of the one-state solution are almost irrelevant for they feel that a one-state solution is the only just solution to the conflict.

The two most ill-defined Israeli borders are, unsurprisingly, the fuzzy boundaries between Israel and Gaza and between Israel and the West Bank (the northern border with Lebanon comes in a close third, but I won't discuss it here). Let us begin with Gaza, from which Israel "disengaged" in 2005 (though earlier this year a UN report on the human rights situation in Palestine asserted that "it is clear that Israel remains the occupying Power [in Gaza]"). When part of the Gaza-Egypt border was bulldozed in January of this year, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that "It is an international border, it needs to be protected". Presumably, since one side of Gaza (the border with Egypt) is an international border, the other side of Gaza (the border with Israel) is also an international border. However, though it is common to see the term "international border" used in regard to Gaza's border with Egypt (and, before it was destroyed by Israeli military forces in late 2001, the Gaza airport was termed an "international airport"), it is much less common (it is almost an anomaly when it occurs) to see Israel's border with Gaza termed an "international border." Nevertheless, it appears that Israel now sees its border with Gaza as an international border, indeed it will be a mammoth effort on Israel's part to convince anyone otherwise, especially since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza (it will also be a mammoth effort to find an admission of this in print; perhaps it is seen as a truism, perhaps it is mere pedantry on my part, or perhaps it is deliberate obfuscation for whatever reason).

The Israeli border with the West Bank is a much more complicated issue (I can only discuss it briefly here). In fact, technically it is not a border at all, but a temorary cease-fire line, the so-called green line that was the armistice line estabslihed in 1949 after the 1948 war between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states. In the 1967 Six Day War, when Israel conquered the West Bank, amongst other terrirtories, the oft-quoted UN Security Council Resolution 242 called for Israel to withdraw back to the green line (though 242 did not explicitly refer to the green line, saying only that Israel should withdraw "its armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict"). Until a couple of years ago, when the construction of the separation barrier began and thus allowed the Israeli government to unilaterally define its borders, Israel did not seek to define its border with the West Bank. This is so for a variety of reasons, the most pertinent one is the serious water shortage that would afflict Israel if they define their borders along the green line. Withdrawing to the green line would mean that Israel would lose control of the large West Bank mountain aquifers that serve the Palestinians, Israel and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, thus leaving it to the Palestinians to decide how much water to allow Israel (Jonathan Cook observes that, were Israel to withdraw to the green line and a Palestinian state established, however "impoverished the new sovereign Palestinian state [will be], it would lose all legitimacy in the eyes of its own population were it to sell more than a trickle of water to the Israelis.") This is of course an undesirable situation for the Israeli government, and for the region as a whole, for such a severe water shortage will most likely lead to an armed conflict over the control of the region's water resources.

 So why doesn't X recognise Israel? The question should be why doesn't Israel fully define all its borders so as to allow other states to recognise an Israel with specific and permanent borders. These borders should not be set unilaterally, as Israel is attempting to do now, because, as it stands now, that would heavily bias the borders towards Israel and its needs, leaving the remnants to whatever entity is labelled a Palestinian state and thus perpetuating the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

Should Olmert also say "sorry"?

Imagine this: Ehud Olmert, the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, stands inside the Knesset, on the second day of its summer session after its Passover recess, and as the overcrowded public gallery watches on, some in tears, some in disbelief, all within view of vigilant security personnel, Olmert begins a speech that, when its wording was released a day earlier, was heavily criticised for supposedly being plagiarised from a famous speech by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. “I move that today,” Olmert begins, “we honour the indigenous peoples of this land, one of the oldest continuing cultures in human history. We reflect on their past mistreatment. We reflect in particular on the mistreatment of those who were the Displaced Generations – this blemished chapter in our nation's history.”

Olmert pauses momentarily, the sweltering summer air is thick and almost unbearable but it has not stopped thousands of people from gathering across the country in public spaces such as Tel-Aviv's Rabin Square to watch the broadcast live on giant screens set up especially for this occasion. “The time has now come,” Olmert continues, “for the nation to turn a new page in Israel's history by righting the wrongs of the past and so moving forward with confidence to the future. We apologise for the laws and policies of successive parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our fellow inhabitants.”

For a long time it appeared as though such an apology would not be forthcoming. Many had argued that state formation is a violent enterprise, with horrific and often brutal consequences, and that therefore their results, which are abhorrent to us all, are irreversible and must be lived with. No one would expect, they had argued, that the United States of America give back the enormous amount of land, Texas for example, it had taken from Mexico in the early 19th century.

“We apologise especially for the removal of Arab and Palestinian families from their homes, their communities and their country,” as a few protesters jeer and are swiftly escorted out of the public gallery by security, Olmert resumes his speech. “For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Displaced Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry. To the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry. And for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry.”

Olmert takes a deep breath, then exhales in near exhaustion. He is well aware that his popularity among the citizenry is one of the lowest on record for an Israeli Prime Minister, but perhaps this is his chance to redeem himself. “We the Parliament of Israel, the Knesset, respectfully request that this apology be received in the spirit in which it is offered as part of the healing of the nation. There comes a time in the history of nations when their peoples must become fully reconciled to their past if they are to go forward with confidence to embrace their future. Our nation, Israel, has reached such a time. That is why the parliament is today here assembled: to deal with this unfinished business of the nation, to remove a great stain from the nation’s soul and, in a true spirit of reconciliation, to open a new chapter in the history of this great region of the world, the Middle East.”

No compensation, no reparations, no finalising of borders, no further disengagements, no change of state policy for now; just acknowledgment, official recognition of past actions, whatever their reasons and motives, a confession, an admission that you too played a part, to whatever degree, and thus share the responsibility for perpetuating this conflict. Just an apology, please.